all members and a majority vote by the EP. Four Treaties have been implemented over the past 25 years: the Single European Act (SEA), and the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties.
The final key player is the EU Court. The Court's rulings are the supreme authority in the EU on areas in which the Court has jurisdiction (most SN economic policy issues). Court rulings can overturn any national law or national court ruling and they have the force of law in all member nations. They cannot be appealed. While logically necessary given the supranationality, such supremacy is certainly the most unusual aspect of EU economic governance.
II. QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE
No type of EU lawmaking is easy but unanimous decisions are especially difficult. For example, massive cross-border VAT fraud (acknowledged and studied for more than a decade) costs members billions every year, but since decisions must be unanimous, the Council has for years failed to agree technical remedies (e.g. centralizing information or obliging cooperation among national VAT authorities). Until 1987, most EU economic policy was made on an IG basis (unanimity in the Council). Little got done beyond maintenance of the customs union and the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP).
One of the clearest signs of increased cooperation is found in the shifting of many policy areas from the IG basis (unanimity) to the SN basis (QMV). The biggest change came with the 1987 SEA. QMV became the decision rule for most issues pertaining to the Single Market (free movement of goods, services, workers and capital), thus switching an enormous swath of policy decisions form IG to SN. This shift is best thought of as an exogenous big-push initiativesomething like the EU's equivalent of the Thatcher-Reagan pro-market reforms of the 1980s.
With the SEA in place, the integration-minded Commission (led by Jacques Delors) rapidly expanded the range of areas covered by SN procedures using its agenda-setting power and the ToR's broad goals. Members reigned in this tendency by establishing three categories, or 'pillars', of policy in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and explicitly limiting SN to first-pillar matters (basically the Single Market). In matters of defense and foreign policy (second pillar), and home and justice affairs (third pillar) decision making is IG.
Members are reluctant to expand QMV to new areas but the rising importance of immigration, and transnational crime and terrorism has led to the switching to QMV in several areas previously considered matters of purely national concern. I take this as qualitative evidence that EU members have reacted to globalization by embracing deeper international cooperation.
Specifically, the Treaties in 1997 and 2000 moved a number of areas to QMV.
Additional qualitative evidence can be found in the EP's growing power. Initially, it had a merely consultative role with no power to block or amend. It has gained power in each of the last four EU Treaties and will gain even more if the Reform Treaty is ratified. While the justification was that this lessens the 'democratic deficit', it also reduces members' ability to set economic policy unilaterally. Since each nation could have vetoed this, they all must have approved of this restriction on their national sovereignty in economic policy.
The final bit of evidence is found in EU enlargement. Given the EU's economic size, nations on its fringes are unable to control economic policy unilaterally. Their own industries demand that national policies mimic EU laws to avoid the cost of two sets of rules. Nations such as Switzerland and Norway resisted joining but have instead signed agreements that oblige them to implement most EU laws in exchange for equal access to the EU market. They have, however, no formal input into the lawmaking process. Most nations in Europe looked at this 'regulation without representation' and decided that they would have more control inside the EU despite QMV. Enlargement, can thus be thought of as an indication that nations faced with deeply integrated markets feel they gain control from pooling their sovereignty on economic policy.
III. A MODEL OF THE FLOW OF EU LEGISLATION
The EU passes hundreds of legislative acts annually. This flow has gradually fallen over the past two decades and this might be taken as evidence against the received wisdom. This conclusion, however, overlooks the fact that the flow of laws is governed by the balance of decision-making costs and benefits. Since the received wisdom concerns only the benefits, I
posit and estimate a model that distinguishes changes in decision-making costs and benefits.
Decision-making costs -in the sense of James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962) -vary enormously over different policies. Some laws are passed in a single day; others take years.
Roughly speaking, policies that entail international redistribution are more contentious and thus have higher decision-making costs. What determines which laws are proposed and passed? I suggest that laws are passed up to the point where the marginal decision-making cost just equals the marginal benefit. The neoclassical supply and demand curves are the marginal cost and marginal benefit curve, respectively, so I think of this as a supply and demand model of EU lawmaking. The payoff to this insight is that the decision-making cost is also an indication of its marginal benefit -just as the price in a competitive market is equal to both the marginal production cost and marginal benefit to consumers.
While decision-making costs are impossible to measure directly, political scientists Thomas Koenig, Brooke Luetgert, and Tanja Dannwolf (2006) have gathered a rich dataset that includes the number of days between each law's formal proposal and its adoption. I take this as a proxy for the average decision-making cost. only the SEA is statistically significant. The supply shifter, as expected, is negative and significant indicating that the supply curve is gradually shifting to the northwest. One standard measure of economic integration is overall trade openness as defined by the sum of imports and exports over GDP. When this is included as another demand shifter its influence is estimated as negative. This suggests the intriguing possibility that overall openness dampens the demand for EU cooperation while EU specific measures, like SEA, increase the demand.
Although these results require further exploration and an expansion of the data sample, they are broadly supportive of the idea that the equilibrium flow of EU laws balances the marginal benefit (demand) and marginal cost (supply) for laws with the delay acting as a proxy for the 'price.' Assuming the Commission proposes laws up to the point where the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit, the delay is a proxy for the decision-making marginal benefit as well as the marginal decision-making cost. As such, the rising delay is consistent with the hypothesis that globalization has increased the value of cooperation.
IV. SHIFTING POWER AND THE NATURE OF EU COOPERATION
In the words of its founding Treaty, the EU is both a 'union of states' and a 'union of The actual and equipotent-citizen power distribution changed with each of the six enlargements. Table 2 shows the estimated weight on the union-of-citizens distribution for each configuration. The weight was near 80 percent for most of the EU's history, but moved sharply up with the 2004 enlargement. The driving force behind this change was the Nice Treaty voting reforms (first applied to the EU25), which shifted much power to large members. The justification for this reform was that decision making with so many small members would be unmanageable under the old rules which gave small and tiny members power shares far in excess of their population shares. The proposed Reform Treaty rules will shift even more power to big members, especially Germany. Notes: Ordinary least square regression of square-root population shares on NBIs.
The statistical results together with the qualitative discussion motivating the Nice and Reform
Treaty voting reforms presents support for the notion that EU members have agreed to changes in their economic policy making institutions in order to maintain their ability to make SN decisions. This of course does not directly confirm the received wisdom. No causality can be ascribed to the correlation between the shift toward the union-of-citizens power distribution and progressive integration, but the correlation is consistent with predictions of the received wisdom.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This short paper argues that deep economic integration in Europe reduced the effectiveness of unilateral economic policy making and members reacted by embracing deeper international cooperation. The process, however, was two-way -deeper lawmaking cooperation facilitated deeper economic integration and vice versa.
The state of globalization in most parts of the world is decades behind the degree of economic integration among EU nations, but the negotiating agenda of global and non-European regional trade agreements are expanding and now go far beyond border measures such as tariffs and quotas. If this trend continues, nations are likely to find it increasing difficult to manage their economic policies in isolation. The attraction of international cooperation on issues such as product standards, investment rights, intellectual property rights, financial markets etc. will grow. While the EU is unique in many aspects, the institutional and political reaction of EU nations to economic integration provides lessons for the rest of the world. As global integration deepens, nations are likely to find their interests are best served by deepening international cooperation on economic policies.
